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National Intelligence Daily

**Thursday
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**WESTERN EUROPE- Increasing Criticism
US-NICARAGUA:**

Criticism by West European countries of the mining of Nicaraguan harbors is being intensified by the US refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in cases relating to Central America. [redacted]

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An official in the Dutch Foreign Ministry, on the instructions of Foreign Minister Van Den Broek, told the US Embassy yesterday his government has "great difficulties" with the US decision on the ICJ and finds it hard to defend. The Embassy reports that the US position may cast more doubt on The Hague's final decision on INF deployments. It also notes that those opponents of deployment who rely on legal rather than political or ethical arguments may try to exploit Washington's stand. [redacted]

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Norwegian Foreign Minister Stray, in a parliamentary debate yesterday on the controversy, expressed regret about US policy. He announced that the Norwegian Embassy in Washington has been instructed to ask the US to clarify its role in Nicaragua. Although Stray tried to balance parliamentary criticism by claiming that the US has some right to intervene in the region, a member of his party said the Foreign Minister might have to retract his comments and take a tougher line against US policy in Central America. [redacted]

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In the UK, 76 Labor Party MPs petitioned Parliament yesterday to protest the US actions. In Belgium, an official in the Foreign Ministry told the US Embassy yesterday that French Foreign Minister Cheysson and other EC Foreign Ministers had expressed concern about the situation during their meeting on Tuesday, but that the EC has no current plans to take action. The Spanish Government delivered a protest note to the US Embassy in Madrid yesterday condemning the mining. [redacted]

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Comment: Domestic pressures probably will continue to raise the level of public and official criticism of the US decision on ICJ jurisdiction and of overall US policy in Central America. In addition, West European politicians and the press continue to worry that Iran will use the mining of Nicaraguan waters as a justification at some point to block the movement of oil supplies through the Strait of Hormuz. [redacted]

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SUDAN:**Increasing Labor Unrest**

President Nimeiri has failed to end a strike by doctors, and he will have to soften his position to avoid potentially damaging sympathy strikes. [redacted]

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Sudanese security forces last Sunday arrested 43 doctors who had resigned because the government refused to meet their demands for better pay and hospital conditions. The US Embassy reports that on Tuesday Nimeiri released the arrested doctors, except for a few he considered leftist sympathizers. [redacted]

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[redacted] the arrests have made the doctors more determined to continue their strike. [redacted]

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Last week Nimeiri closed Khartoum University, where professors support the doctors and have threatened their own strike. [redacted]

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[redacted] Last Saturday riot police used tear gas to disperse student demonstrators near the university's campus. [redacted]

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Comment: Most Sudanese appear to support the doctors and to doubt Nimeiri's claim that the strike is part of a Communist plot. A series of sympathy strikes could paralyze the economy and lead to disturbances. [redacted]

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In such circumstances, there is a strong possibility that the military might fail to support Nimeiri. Military morale already has been shaken by the insurgency in the south and by the Libyan airstrike. [redacted]

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UK:**Tide Turning Against Strikers**

The government's strategy of using restraint in dealing with the coal miners' strike seems to be turning sentiment against the militant strikers. [redacted]

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Comment: The executive council of the coal miners' union could decide today to hold a vote on a nationwide strike in the next few weeks. Militant union members, led by union President Scargill, have been staging regional strikes for the past four weeks to protest the government's plan to close 20 unproductive mines within a year. Moderates—who dominate the council—have been urging a ballot to frustrate Scargill's scheme to transform the regional strikes, which do not require membership approval, into a nationwide walkout. [redacted]

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Pickets so far have shut down two-thirds of the country's coal mines and idled more than 120,000 miners. The union's membership, however, is deeply divided on the issue and is unlikely to sanction the continuation of the strikes. [redacted]

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The credibility of the strikers appears to be eroding. The government's refusal to seek legal charges against the militants reportedly has deprived the miners of a unifying cause. [redacted]

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The press also has increased its criticism of Scargill, suggesting that he is using the strikes to conduct a political crusade against the government. The US Embassy reports that even the leadership of the Labor Party, which traditionally has represented the trade unions in Parliament, hopes a national strike ballot would go against Scargill. It also reports that the public generally disapproves of the militants' actions. [redacted]

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The militants are receiving only sporadic backing from other union members. The rail and steel unions, which pledged solidarity last week, are wavering in their support. In addition, the members of the country's second-largest coal pit have twice voted to continue working. [redacted]

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Such uneven support probably will prevent the strikers from disrupting the economy. The government says it has enough coal on hand to last six months, and the arrival of warmer weather should relieve the pressure to dip into stockpiles. [redacted]

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The Embassy reports that power plants and steel mills will not begin to feel pinched until early fall even if the strikes last that long. According to press accounts, however, the government has been forced to cancel a planned cut in coal prices. [redacted]

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FRANCE:**Possible Ministerial Changes**

Mounting public criticism of President Mitterrand's domestic policies may force a ministerial shakeup in coming months.

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Press reports have emphasized that increasing Communist opposition to the government's policies threatens for the first time to rupture the leftist coalition. Communist leader Marchais has publicly criticized the government's plan to reform the steel industry as a "tragic error," and he has encouraged participation in the "March on Paris," which is scheduled for tomorrow.

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Comment: An expected poor showing by leftists in the election of the European Parliament in June may encourage Mitterrand to replace some of his key ministers. Well-publicized press accounts and opinion polls indicate that the government's reduction of jobs in ailing industries and its financial austerity measures have hurt its popularity.

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Key groups that support the government have led the protests against its economic policies. They include the largest Socialist-affiliated trade union and dissidents in the Socialist leadership of the National Assembly. Mitterrand almost certainly would hope that new faces in the government would help rebuild leftist support in preparation for the legislative elections in 1986.

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
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**USSR: Leadership Appointments**

New state posts for Politburo members Gorbachev and General Secretary Chernenko will improve their ability to deal with foreign affairs. The Supreme Soviet session yesterday appointed Gorbachev to head the same foreign affairs commission to which Chernenko was named in 1982 after Brezhnev died. Chernenko was elected Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, or head of state, as Soviet sources had predicted, and Premier Tikhonov was reappointed to his post. Today the session will name the rest of the Council of Ministers to serve under Tikhonov, discuss the proposed school reform, elect a Supreme Court, and appoint a USSR prosecutor. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Chernenko's real political power continues to reside in his post as General Secretary, but the "presidency" legitimizes his status in dealing with foreign heads of state. Similarly, Gorbachev already held a stronger position as the party's chief executive under Chernenko, but the additional post adds visibility to his activities in foreign affairs, and it also strengthens his credentials as a future contender to become General Secretary. The 53-year-old Gorbachev's firm hold on the party's number-two position makes him the heir apparent in any immediate succession to Chernenko. [REDACTED]

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
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**USSR-EASTERN EUROPE: High-level Meetings Planned**

Soviet and East European leaders will hold their first high-level discussion since General Secretary Chernenko's succession during a series of conferences and summits that begin later this month.

[redacted] a meeting of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers will take place in Budapest on 19 and 20 April. The meeting will discuss the situation in Europe following INF deployments, according to a Yugoslav press report sourced to observers in Budapest. The press report states a summit of Warsaw Pact party leaders in Sofia will follow the Foreign Ministers' meeting. Bulgarian leader Zhivkov last week announced in Poland that a CEMA summit also would be held soon. [redacted]

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Comment: These meetings probably will provide the first indications of Soviet policy under Chernenko toward the other members of the Warsaw Pact and how much latitude they may have for resisting Moscow's political and economic demands. Reports from several sources suggest that the Soviets are seeking tighter coordination of foreign policy under Chernenko. There may be conflicts over this issue at one or more of the impending meetings. [redacted]

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
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**USSR-PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN: New Soviet Proposal**

UN Special Representative on Afghanistan Cordovez has told the US Embassy in Islamabad that the USSR has made a new proposal for separate and parallel discussions on Soviet troop withdrawals. He says that, if Pakistan will negotiate seriously on noninterference in Afghan internal affairs, and if the US will "guarantee" Pakistani pledges, Moscow will immediately negotiate with its Afghan allies on withdrawing Soviet troops. The results of both negotiations could then be incorporated into a UN accord. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The USSR apparently has gone back to its longstanding public position that troop withdrawals are a bilateral issue between Moscow and Kabul. In talks with Cordovez last April, the Soviets agreed that withdrawals could be a subject for negotiations between the Afghans and Pakistanis but later rejected the idea. Moscow's current offer suggests that the Soviets want to keep the negotiations alive but that they are not serious about negotiating. [REDACTED]

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
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Members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC)

^a Afghanistan's membership was suspended in January 1980

Note: The Palestine Liberation Organization is a member of the OIC

Jerusalem Committee Members of the OIC

Bangladesh	Jordan	Pakistan
Guinea	Lebanon	PLO
Indonesia	Mauritania	Saudi Arabia
Iran	Morocco	Senegal
Iraq	Niger	Syria

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MOROCCO: Islamic Committee To Meet

King Hassan is to chair a meeting of the "Jerusalem Committee" of the Islamic Conference on 20 April to discuss the proposal by the US Congress to move the US Embassy in Israel to Jerusalem. The US Embassy in Rabat reports that Hassan has been urged by several Islamic states to convene the committee. An adviser to the King says that Hassan will have no choice but to advocate a tough response if the legislation is passed and the Embassy is moved. [redacted]

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Comment: Hassan is well informed on the issues involved in the proposal. The committee may decide to send him to the US to deliver a message approved at the meeting. If the Embassy is moved, the conference may call on its 45 members to break diplomatic relations with the US. [redacted]

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AFRICA: Prospects for an OAU Summit

Algeria and other supporters of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic are urging a decision to hold the next OAU summit meeting in Addis Ababa in late May, according to the US Embassy in Addis Ababa. The support of 34 African countries—two-thirds of the OAU members—would be necessary to force a meeting. The backers of the Saharan republic hope to gain OAU membership for it. [redacted]

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Comment: Morocco and other moderates in the OAU will seek another venue for the summit and may succeed in delaying it until late this year. Morocco apparently has lost support among some African states, who blame Rabat for stalling settlement efforts sponsored by the OAU on the Western Sahara dispute. The seating of the Saharan Democratic Arab Republic at the summit would prompt a walkout by Morocco and probably some of its allies. A summit in Addis Ababa next month would be likely to extend the term of the current OAU chairman—Ethiopia's Mengistu—for another year. [redacted]

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VENEZUELA: Progress Toward Debt Rescheduling

Venezuela has improved its prospects for a major debt rescheduling agreement later this year. The US Embassy reports that the government recently repaid almost all of the estimated \$225 million in overdue interest on the public-sector debt. This enables US banks to avoid classifying these loans as nonperforming and reporting reduced first-quarter earnings. To break the impasse in the negotiations on rescheduling, Venezuela has promised to begin paying \$900 million toward interest on the private-sector debt. [REDACTED]

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Comment: The interest payments and President Lusinchi's new economic adjustment program are important steps in arranging the refinancing of the \$14 billion due to banks this year. International bankers are waiting to see whether Caracas follows through on its promise to begin paying overdue private-sector interest, which will require the government to provide foreign exchange. Caracas probably will begin to tap its \$11 billion in reserves to repay these debts, thereby opening the way for a rescheduling agreement. [REDACTED]


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INDIA-BANGLADESH: Deteriorating Relations

The Chief Minister of the Indian State of Assam has told the US Ambassador that India has begun construction of a fence along its border with Bangladesh. The fence, which Dhaka strongly opposes, is intended to stop the illegal entry of Bangladeshis. It was proposed by officials in Assam last year, following a major outbreak of ethnic violence between Assamese Hindus and Bengali Muslims. [REDACTED]

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Comment: Relations between New Delhi and Dhaka are already strained over water sharing and land disputes. Cost and technical problems are likely to deter New Delhi from fencing the entire 4,000-kilometer border, but it will build sections in those areas where the likelihood of illegal entry is greatest. In Dhaka, Chief Martial Law Administrator Ershad's political opponents will use the controversy to strengthen their charge that he is submissive to India. [REDACTED]

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WEST GERMANY: Metalworkers' Strike Averted

Leaders of the pacesetting metalworkers' union on Tuesday backed off from calling for a strike vote by its 2.5 million members on its demand for a 35-hour workweek. According to one poll, as little as 20 percent of the membership was willing to strike over the issue. The union agreed instead to resume talks with management next Tuesday. The press says the union is looking for a face-saving conclusion to its uncharacteristically militant campaign for a 35-hour workweek. [REDACTED]

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Comment: While the possibility of short, selective strikes remains, an industrywide action appears to have been averted. Government and business leaders had feared that the shortened workweek with no cut in wages would have increased employers' costs, threatening West Germany's competitiveness and the accelerating pace of recovery. A peaceful settlement would be a political victory for Chancellor Kohl's government, whose proposals for legislation on early retirement helped deprive labor of an issue. The opposition Social Democrats, on the other hand, have endorsed the union's demand for a 35-hour workweek. [REDACTED]

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In Brief**Middle East**

— **Lebanese** Foreign Ministry official says ties with **Iran** and **Libya** to be restored once Tehran demonstrates “good intentions” . . . probably meant as incentive to Libya to curb support for opposition . . . ties with Iran would mollify Shias. [redacted]

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USSR

— **Soviets** have notified US, as “goodwill gesture,” of multiple ballistic missile launches between 6 and 21 April . . . could include ICBMs, IRBMs, and SLBMs . . . also may test SS-17 emergency communications system, which could send launch authorizations to missile complexes. [redacted]

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Asia

— Beijing rumor mill says **Chinese** party propaganda chief sacked . . . may be scapegoat for leadership’s mishandling of “spiritual pollution” campaign . . . he allegedly tried undermine party leader Hu Yaobang by expanding campaign. [redacted]

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Americas

— **Peruvian** cabinet changes offer little chance of correcting government’s drift . . . despite pressure to ease austerity measures, fiscal conservatives will fill key economic posts . . . backpedaling on austerity would endanger talks with IMF. [redacted]

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South Asia

— Violence continues in **Indian** state of Punjab . . . resentment rising against police control measures . . . [redacted]

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— Compromise wage agreement ends 26-day strike in major **Indian** ports . . . press estimates production and export losses as high as \$2 billion . . . port congestion will hinder economy for several more months. [redacted]


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Distribution of Lebanese Confessional Groups

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Special Analysis

LEBANON:

New Approaches

Following Syria's failure at Lausanne to arrange a political settlement in Lebanon, Maronite Christians and Druze have decided to abandon efforts at political reform and are now pushing to transform Lebanon into a federation of sectarian ministates. This approach works against the political and economic interests of the Muslim majority, especially the Shias, whose approval will be necessary for any lasting accommodation. The proponents of federation probably will try to take advantage of the current hiatus in foreign involvement in Lebanon to override Shia opposition.

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Christian hardliners remain unwilling to negotiate with Muslims and Druze over sharing power in a unified state. The abrogation of the Lebanese-Israeli accord has reduced Syrian pressure on the Maronite-dominated Lebanese Government to respond to reforms.

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Moreover, the current power struggle in Damascus and the lower policy profiles of the US and Israel have interrupted foreign initiatives to achieve a Lebanese settlement. As a result, factional leaders probably believe they have more room to explore alternative strategies.

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Exploring New Strategies

Lebanese Forces militia commander Fadi Fram has told the US Embassy that he anticipates a period of precarious calm while the factions explore new strategies. Fram expects that eventual progress on security issues will affect political developments and enable the contesting groups to reach a modus vivendi. He believes this eventually will lead to a federal government in Lebanon.

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Fram acknowledges that the Lebanese Forces militia has temporarily stopped trying to reach a settlement with Shia leader Barri—who opposes efforts to change the government structure—in favor of cooperating with Druze leader Junblatt. The Shias are preoccupied with Syrian and Israeli control over their main population centers. As a result, they are not now in a position to resist the machinations of the Maronites and the Druze.

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Junblatt has not been a consistent advocate of a federated Lebanon, and in the past he has turned down the concept of a Druze ministate. Nevertheless, his inability to reach agreement with Gemayel has led him to conclude that his best alternative is to deal directly with the Lebanese Forces.

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
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Estimated Percentage of Lebanese Confessional Groups in 1983



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The Druze and Lebanese Forces recently took a step toward an accommodation. They agreed to an Israeli-sponsored plan that resulted in the evacuation of Maronite militiamen from a predominantly Druze region south of Beirut. In exchange, the Druze agreed to protect returning Christian residents. [redacted]

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Federation is not a satisfactory solution for the Druze, however, primarily because it leaves their territory vulnerable to Israeli and Syrian influence. Without a central government committed to protecting the Shuf, the region could become a buffer—or a battleground—for conflicting Syrian and Israeli interests. [redacted]

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Resistance to Federation

Druze overtures to the Maronites underscore the conflict of interests between the Druze and the Shias, who recently collaborated in wresting control of West Beirut from the government. The Shias want to turn their advantage in numbers into political and economic power. They oppose federalism because it would dilute their strength and produce a central authority without any interest in freeing Shia population centers in the south and in the Bekaa Valley from Israeli and Syrian control. [redacted]

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The Sunnis, traditional allies of the politically dominant Maronites, also oppose the federal concept. Like the Shias, the Sunni community is scattered. Political decentralization would confine them to their demographic strongholds around Tripoli and Sidon, far from the commercial heart of Lebanon and subject to Syrian or Israeli influence. [redacted]

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Non-Maronite Christians, who outnumber the Druze, have neither a defined territory nor military leverage to defend their interests. Similarly, other political groups that are not strictly sectarian would lose out in a federated state. [redacted]

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In the short term, the Sunnis will be forced to ally themselves with the Shias. This alliance is awkward, particularly in view of recent Druze and Shia efforts to suppress the Murabitun, a band of street thugs that nonetheless is the only militia representing Sunni interests. Relations between the two groups will founder eventually, if only because the Sunnis fear that the numerically dominant Shias will displace them politically. [redacted]

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The Maronites and the Druze may be able to take advantage of the present power void in Lebanon to lay the groundwork for their own sectarian cantons. Over the longer term, however, they cannot force the Muslim majority to accept a federal system that disregards

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
Muslim—especially Shia—demands for political and economic power. Unless Shia aspirations can be satisfied, any attempt to reorganize the state will encounter determined resistance. 




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DIA Comment

DIA agrees that, in the aftermath of the Lausanne conference and the departure of the Multinational Force, the intensity of efforts by regional and international parties to assist Lebanon in achieving national reconciliation has indeed been reduced. However, neither Syria nor to a lesser extent Israel feels that its interests will be served by a more institutionalized partition than already exists, or by the subjugation of any particular faction by other factions. 

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Internally, the alliance between the Shia and the Druze has not deteriorated to an extent that would mandate a Phalange-Druze coalition strong enough to force the Muslim community to accept a federal state. Furthermore, there is no evidence that Phalange-Druze discussions on federation have progressed beyond the preliminary stage, and, as each has a different definition of "federalism," it seems improbable that such talks will lead to an effective alliance. Finally, there is a prospect of further withdrawals by Israeli, and possibly eventually Syrian, forces. This could allow Shias currently located in foreign-occupied areas to join their coreligionists in confronting any attempt to partition Lebanon. 

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